INTRODUCTION
Moral injury refers to disturbances experienced by combat veterans related to guilt, shame, anger, and betrayal arising from violations of their moral code (Bryan et al., 2016; Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016; Jones, 2018; Litz et al., 2009) . It may arise from specific acts, such as killing in combat (e.g., killing innocent civilians), but may also be generated by a broader experience that violates deeply held moral and ethical beliefs and expectations. Individual soldiers are left to make sense of their own actions and the actions of others, to integrate those actions with their existing moral and ethical frameworks, and to manage emotional responses prompted by the relative congruence or incongruence between past moral beliefs and recent actions. The inability to integrate long-held ethical worldviews with specific personal actions may lead to ongoing psychological distress manifested by specific behavioral problems (Litz et al., 2009; McClymond & Anthony, 2014) .
Both moral injury and military-related posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are associated with consequences of participation in warfare. A required criterion for a PTSD diagnosis is exposure to an event that poses a threat to physical safety; prevailing models of PTSD are predicated on exposure to life-threatening events and are predominantly studied as disorders of fear processing (Milad et al., 2009; Shalev, Liberzon, & Marmar, 2017) . Profound moral injury, on the other hand, may be experienced without direct exposure to a personal life threat, and models of moral injury are related to disturbances in social and moral cognition (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016) . Our goal was to investigate the hotly debated comparisons between moral injury and PTSD by probing the relevant neural systems (Bryan et al., 2016; Bryan, Bryan, Roberge, Leifker, & Rozek, 2018; Litz et al., 2009 ).
The moral injury syndrome and PTSD overlap on several symptoms including anger, depression, anxiety, substance abuse, insomnia, nightmares, suicidal thoughts, shame, and guilt (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016; however, see Bryan et al., 2018) . Although the measurement of PTSD is well-established (Blake et al., 1995; Weathers et al., 2013) , the measurement of moral injury syndrome is evolving. The self-report Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES) developed by Nash et al. (2013) is a widely utilized scale measuring both subjective appraisals of exposure to morally injurious events and distress associated with these events. Here, we employed MIES as an initial exploration of neural signals associated with moral injury. The contributory events to MIES are captured by two latent factors: perceived transgressions by self or others (the transgression subscale), and perceived betrayals by others (betrayal subscale). The transgression subscale includes witnessing acts of commission, distress resulting from others' acts of commission, and perpetration of or distress due to acts of commission/omission. An example would be a soldier who kills an unarmed civilian who was mistakenly believed to be armed. On the other hand, the betrayal subscale measures perceived betrayals by previously trusted military leaders, fellow service members, and nonmilitary others (e.g., a spouse). For instance, a patriotic soldier in a battle may begin to wonder whether the war is not as justified as the leaders have declared.
Both moral transgression (Jones, 2018) and betrayal (Platt, Luoma, & Freyd, 2017) have been linked to feelings of guilt or shame. The release of DSM-5 introduced shame and guilt into the criterion-D symptoms of PTSD (Weathers et al., 2013) . Patients with depression, which has high co-occurrence with PTSD and moral injury (Bryan et al., 2018; Nash et al., 2013) , also frequently experience symptoms of shame and guilt (Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011) . Shame is associated with the ability to understand the social consequences of one's own behavior as judged by others (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) .
On the other hand, guilt concerns self-perception of one's own behavior in relation to societal norms or self-imposed standards (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) . In this sense, moral injury and PTSD are related with both self-referential processes and theory of mind (ToM). Selfreferential processing refers to functions for decoding information about oneself (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004) , while ToM refers to the ability to assign and attribute mental states to both self and others (Baron-Cohen, 1995) . Our previous work studying brain responses to guilt scenarios showed that the guilt ratings were positively associated with activations in dorsal mPFC and supramarginal gyrus that is included in the IPL (Morey et al., 2012) . Roth, Kaffenberger, Herwig, and Bruhl (2014) investigated the neural correlates of autographical recall about shame and found that shame versus a neutral condition elicited stronger activation in mPFC and PCC as well as weaker activation in IPL. Interestingly, studies on shame and guilt (Bastin et al., 2016) have also reported findings in amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) that are hyperresponsive in PTSD (Hughes & Shin, 2011) . For instance, Pulcu et al. (2014) detected increased amygdala response to shame in remitted major depressive disorder. Wagner, N'Diaye, Ethofer, and Vuilleumier (2011) found that guilt in healthy subjects elicited stronger activations in dACC and amygdala than shame. In summary, these previous studies explored the neural correlates of shame and guilt, which are the core components of moral injury (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016; Jones, 2018) . Thus, we hypothesized that morally injurious events measured by moral transgression and betrayal would correlate with brain responses in the DMN, amygdala, and dACC. Given their conceptual differences, we also hypothesized that moral transgression and betrayal would be related to a different brain response in these areas.
This knowledge may help us to understand the neural underpinnings of moral injury and PTSD as well as to find potential neural targets for clinical intervention. Our findings may help in the construction of a new and complementary neural model of moral processing.
In the present study, we investigated the relationship between clinical measures of morally injurious events and PTSD symptoms with brain responses measured by spontaneous fluctuation and functional connectivity during resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) scanning. The rs-fMRI does not measure responses to explicit tasks and is thus convenient for investigating the brain's functional organization in patients with psychiatric and behavioral disorders. A number of studies have demonstrated that rs-fMRI data predict following behavioral performance in explicit tasks Li et al., 2013; Zou et al., 2013) . The spontaneous fluctuations reflect localized neural activity, whereas functional connectivity provides information on correlated activity between two brain regions (Lv et al., 2018) . The term "functional" is used because we infer a connection between two regions with temporally correlated activity, rather than evidence of an actual physical (structural) connection. This inference is made by observing increased activity in region 1 over time corresponds to increased activity in region 2 at similar times, and decreased activity in region 1 over time corresponds to decreased activity in region 2 at similar times. This is in contrast to spontaneous fluctuations, which refers to activity in a specific region rather than , which is a common analysis approach for spontaneous neural activity during rs-fMRI and has been widely employed to investigate the neural underpinnings of various psychiatric disorders (Fryer et al., 2015; Zuo et al., 2010) . ALFF is positively correlated with other measures of spontaneous fluctuations such as regional homogeneity (Yuan et al., 2013) and regional connectivity (Yu et al., 2013 ), thus we limited analyses to ALFF for simplicity. Moreover, we measured functional connectivity based on the correlation between the BOLD time course of the seed region and that of all other areas in the brain (Shen, 2015) . The functional connectivity method has also been widely used in studies on psychiatric disorders (Lee, Smyser, & Shimony, 2013) .
Studies on shame and guilt using rs-fMRI techniques are scarce, while previous work showed that PTSD patients compared to controls are associated with altered spontaneous brain activity during rsfMRI in several areas including those within DMN such as mPFC, PCC (Wang et al., 2016) , and IPL (Disner, Marquardt, Mueller, Burton, & Sponheim, 2018) . Moreover, altered resting-state functional connectivity of amygdala was reported in PTSD (Brown et al., 2014) , and the functional connectivity patterns in DMN were also found to relate with PTSD symptoms (King et al., 2016; Reuveni et al., 2016) . Previous taskbased or resting-state fMRI studies have not examined the neural correlates of MIES. Our study was partly hypothesis driven and partly exploratory study. We investigated the neural correlates of MIES and PTSD indexed by either ALFF in regions of interest (ROIs) including the DMN areas as well as amygdala and dACC (Disner et al., 2018) or functional connectivity between these ROIs (seeds) and the rest of the brain. We also examined the relationships between resting-state brain responses and transgression-or betrayal-related subscores of the MIES.
METHODS AND MATERIALS

Participants and procedure
Detailed demographic and clinical information are described in Table 1 .
Participants were recruited from Iraq and Afghanistan era military service members in the VA Mid-Atlantic MIRECC Post-Deployment Mental Health Repository (Brancu et al., 2017) . The present moral injury study combined data from 26 participants who participated in two postrepository studies of combat-exposed veterans focused on (1) moral injury and (2) rs-fMRI. In study (1), approximately 300 participants completed questionnaire packets by mail that included MIES to assess moral injury (Nash et al., 2013) , depressive symptoms using the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) , and combat exposure with the Combat Exposure Scale (CES; Lund, Sipprelle, Foy, & Strachan, 1984) . In study (2), participants completed a battery of measures, including determination of PTSD diagnosis using the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blake et al., 1995; Weathers et al., 2013 ) based on symptoms experienced in the past month. Fourteen participants completed DSM-IV and the remaining 12 participants completed DSM-5. To ensure consistency and reliability of CAPS scores between subjects, and because it is possible to "translate" from DSM-5 to DSM-IV but not the reverse, we used established methods for converting the CAPS-5 scores to CAPS-IV scores for the 12 subjects scanned after migrating to CAPS-5 (Supporting Information).
TA B L E 1 Demographic and clinical information (N = 26, two females)
Mean
STD Range
Max range
Age ( Note. MIES-transgression and MIES-betrayal were measured by the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES; Nash et al., 2013) . PTSD symptoms were measured by the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS; Weathers et al., 2014) . Depressive symptoms were measured by the Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck et al., 1996) . Combat exposure was measured by the Combat Exposure Scale (CES; Lund et al., 1984) . STD, standard deviation; Range, range of values in our sample; Max Range, possible range according to the questionnaires and scales.
The method is adapted from personal communication with Dr. Brian 
Brain image acquisition, preprocessing, and ROI selection
The detailed information of brain image acquisition, preprocessing, and ROI (also seed) selection can be found in the Supporting Information.
We here employed seven ROIs: mPFC, PCC, left/right IPL, left/right Amygdala, and dACC, as shown in Figure 1 .
Data analytic plan
Consistent with previous reports on the relationship between MIES and PTSD measures (Bryan et al., 2016; Nash et al., 2013) , the following findings motivated the selection of our statistical models. We found that the CAPS score was positively correlated with MIES-total (R = 0.667, P < 0.001), MIES-transgression (R = 0.546, P = 0.004),
and MIES-betrayal (R = 0.672, P < 0.001). MIES-transgression was also found to positively correlated with MIES-betrayal (R = 0.569, P = 0.002). However, as shown in Figure 2 , MIES-total, MIEStransgression, and MIES-betrayal are all correlated with the CAPS to varying degrees, but each contributes unique variance to the relationship. This observation motivated us to examine possible dissociations between the neural correlates of related concepts.
Two statistical models were employed to fully understand the relationship between resting-state brain responses and self-report of To investigate whether the correlations were statistically different, we employed the Williams's t-test (Weaver & Wuensch, 2013) , which is appropriate for the comparison between two nonindependent correlations with a variable in common.
ALFF ROI analyses
The mean ALFF values from each of the seven ROIs were extracted using the MarsBar toolbox (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net). The MAT-LAB partial correlation function was utilized to control for the effects of covariates of no interest. The FDR method (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) 
ALFF whole-brain analyses
The ROI analyses may have overlooked the MIES-or CAPS-related ALFF changes in regions outside the selected ROIs. We thus employed two multiple regression models (corresponding to Model I and II, respectively) to investigate the relationship between whole-brain voxel-wise ALFF and each of the variables of interest after adjusting for other variables. The whole-brain voxel-wised ALFF analysis was both confirmatory to the ROI analysis and complementary to the ROI analysis. Results were thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected and survived P < 0.05 cluster-extent size false discovery rate (FDR) correction.
Seed-based functional connectivity whole-brain analyses
Based on previous neuroimaging studies on moral processing and PTSD, we expected to find MIES-or CAPS-related functional connectivity with the predefined seeds (i.e., aforementioned ROIs). We employed two multiple regression models (corresponding to Model I and II, respectively) to investigate how the functional connectivity between a seed (one of seven ROIs mentioned above) and voxels in the rest of the brain was related with each of the variables of interest after controlling the effects of all the other covariates. Results were thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected and survived P < 0.007 (<0.05/7 given that there were seven seeds) cluster-size FDR correction. If a clinical measure was found to significantly correlate with functional connectivity between a seed and a target brain area, further voxelwise analyses were conducted to test whether the other clinical measures also correlated with functional connectivity between the same seed and target pair. The findings were thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected and survived P < 0.05 small volume corrected (SVC) within the target area.
RESULTS
ALFF ROI findings
For Model I, partial correlations between MIES-total or CAPS scores and average ALFF in all of the ROIs are shown in Table 2 Note. All results were height-thresholded at P < 0.001 and survived P < 0.05 cluster-level FDR correction. BA, Brodmann's area; Size, number of voxels within the cluster; Z, z value; x/y/z, MNI coordinates. L, left; R, right.
was not significantly different from the correlation with CAPS (t = -2.090, P = 0.976).
ALFF whole-brain analyses findings
For Model I, MIES-total was negatively related with ALFF in the right posterior insula (maximum effect at x/y/z/ = 38/-20/20, Zvalue = 4.57, cluster size = 132 voxels).
For Model II, as shown in Table 4 
Seed-based whole-brain functional connectivity analyses results
For Model I, MIES-total was positively correlated with functional connectivity between right amygdala seed and right thalamus (maximum effect at x/y/z/ = 14/-34/6, Z-value = 4.73, cluster size = 214 voxels).
No significant relationship was detected between CAPS and functional connectivity to the same seed-target pair. nally directed or self-generated thoughts and the ToM regions, which infer the mental states of others (Mar, 2011) . This area robustly activates during response to moral dilemmas, violations of moral principles, and making moral decisions (Heekeren et al., 2005) . The bilateral angular gyrus, in close proximity to the IPL, was found to be more active in the moral-personal condition of pushing a stranger off a bridge to may be occupied by thoughts about how these might be viewed by others, particularly fellow veterans. The ALFF activation we found in the ToM and self-referential processing regions is consistent with these interpretations. By contrast, we did not find any significant relationship between ALFF in IPL and CAPS scores. This negative finding is inconsistent with a recent meta-analysis reporting that spontaneous brain activity in the L-IPL is positively correlated with PTSD symptom severity (Disner et al., 2018) . One potential explanation is that the aforementioned meta-analysis that is based on PTSD did not elaborate on the potential biases incurred by moral injury, shame, guilt, anger, or disrupted social cognition that are often accompanied by PTSD symptoms (Bryan et al., 2016 (Bryan et al., , 2018 Litz et al., 2009 ). The exact role of restingstate spontaneous fluctuations in L-IPL still needs further investigation in PTSD. On the other hand, Bryan et al. (2018) confirmed that both guilt and shame are associated with moral injury but not PTSD, although they have been added into the DSM-5 diagnosis of PTSD (Weathers et al., 2013) . It is possible that ALFF in L-IPL is associated with the neural processing of shame or guilt, although our present results do not necessarily support this conclusion given that we did not specifically examine the neural correlates of shame or guilt. This hypothesis is attractive because it is consistent with previous studies.
For instance, the ratings of guilt to scenarios were reported to positively relate with brain activity in the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (Takahashi et al., 2004) and the left supramarginal gyrus (Morey et al., 2012) , which are both in close proximity to L-IPL. In addition, both shame and guilt elicit activation in the left superior temporal gyrus, which is close to L-IPL (Michl et al., 2014) . The exact role of restingstate spontaneous fluctuations in L-IPL still needs further investigation in PTSD and moral injury.
It is also interesting that ALFF in L-IPL was positively correlated with transgression scores and negatively correlated with betrayal scores. This finding suggests distinct neural underpinnings in L-IPL between perceived transgression and betrayal, consistent with a previous behavioral study (Nash et al., 2013) that dissociated the two latent factors in veterans suffering from moral injury. However, it is hard to determine the exact alteration in neural processing in IPL solely based on ALFF, given the complicated relationship between resting-state brain responses and task-related brain activations. First, stronger ALFF may be related to larger task-related activation in some areas, but smaller activation in other areas (Zou et al., 2013) . Second, larger ALFF does not necessarily represent more efficient processing but a compensatory effect for deficits in patients with specific disorders (Tan et al., 2016) . Third, beyond social cognition, the IPL is associated with semantic processing, number processing, memory retrieval, spatial attention, and reasoning (Seghier, 2013) . Restingstate data cannot differentiate multiple functions in the same area and therefore the exact role of L-IPL in moral injury needs to be clarified with task-based neuroimaging studies. The IPL is more active when engaged in tasks evaluating moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001 ), but less active when posed with moral conflicts as compared to analogous nonmoral scenarios (Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & SinnottArmstrong, 2006) . A recent study on moral transgression in healthy participants by Crockett, Siegel, Kurth-Nelson, Dayan, and Dolan (2017) Aside from our ROI results, we also found that the MIEStransgression score was negatively related with ALFF in the right fusiform gyrus and right posterior insula, whereas MIES-betrayal score was positively related with ALFF in the left precuneus and negatively related with ALFF in the right superior parietal lobule.
The fusiform gyrus plays a crucial role in processing facial stimuli (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006) ; the insula cortex is engaged during emotional and empathic processes (Pascual, Rodrigues, & Gallardo-Pujol, 2013) . The precuneus and superior parietal lobule are either a part of, or close to, DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014) and ToM regions (Mar, 2011) , which play an important role in processing information about sense of self and others. Our findings support the assertion that the individual differences in experiencing morally injurious events are associated with different brain responses in different brain areas related to social cognition and emotion processing.
Besides the ALFF findings, we found that functional connectivity between L-IPL and bilateral precuneus was positively related with PTSD symptoms and negatively associated with MIES total scores, providing further support of the neural dissociation between subjective self-appraisals of exposure to morally injurious events and PTSD symptoms. The IPL-precuneus functional connections have been reported in previous rs-fMRI studies (Igelstrom, Webb, & Graziano, 2015) . Taskbased studies have also documented the coactivations of IPL and precuneus in attention, self-perception, introspection and memory, and social cognition (Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014) . It is possible that moral injury and PTSD are different in a few of these cognitive functions. We also found that MIES-total score was positively correlated with functional connectivity between the right amygdala seed and right thalamus. Moral transgression and betrayal are associated with harm that can be imposed by conspecifics, such as aggressive attack, social exclusion, and reputation damage (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016) , which are all related with extreme negative emotions. The thalamus projects to limbic subcortical structures, particularly the amygdala and ventral striatum, and hence is widely involved in affective processing (Pessoa, 2017; Vertes, Linley, & Hoover, 2015) . It is possible that the amygdala-thalamus functional connection detected in our study plays roles in regulating the affective processing associated with moral transgression and betrayal. Interestingly, the amygdalathalamus circuit has been reported to play an essential role in both the establishment of fear memory and the expression of fear responses (Penzo et al., 2015) . However, we did not find a significant relationship between this circuit and PTSD. This distinction suggests that the thalamus-amygdala circuit may involve subcomponents in response to fear and social harm, respectively, and that resting-state functional connectivity might be insensitive to the individual differences in fear processing. The functional connectivity between left amygdala seed and left fusiform gyrus was positively correlated with MIEStransgression and negatively correlated with MIES-betrayal and CAPS scores. A previous study found that functional connectivity between left amygdala and face-related areas including fusiform gyrus was correlated with the subjective threat rating for faces (Miyahara, Harada, Ruffman, Sadato, & Iidaka, 2013) , and patients with social anxiety disorder showed positive correlation between anxiety severity and amygdala-fusiform functional connectivity in response to fearful faces (Frick, Howner, Fischer, Kristiansson, & Furmark, 2013) . It is possible that MIES-transgression versus MIES-betrayal and CAPS scores are associated with different socioemotional information processing.
These hypotheses will need to be tested in future studies.
There are a few limitations in the present study. First, the correla- and exposure to (R = 0.706, P = 0.011) moral transgression, which makes it challenging to investigate their differences. Perhaps new questionnaires that are currently under development to assess moral injury will more effectively dissociate these phenomena. We know for instance that trauma exposure and PTSD symptoms are generally highly correlated, but we also know that among certain individuals and groups (e.g., resilient individuals) that trauma exposure and PTSD symptoms are relatively weakly correlated. Third, recent work by Bryan et al. (2016) used explanatory factor analysis to show that MIEStransgression could be subdivided into two subscales, transgressions by others (transgressions-others) was related to posttraumatic stress, whereas transgressions by self (transgressions-self) was accompanied with hopelessness, pessimism, and anger. We explored transgressionself and transgression-others associated neural correlates and found that ALFF in the left IPL was positively related to transgressions-self but not transgressions-others (see Supporting Information). Future studies on moral injury with an improved classification will help to delineate the neurobiological subtypes of moral injury. Fourth, morally injurious experiences are often accompanied with different negative emotions such as shame and guilt (Nash et al., 2013) . Anger is possibly a more prominent emotional consequence of transgressions-self and betrayal-related moral injury (Bryan et al., 2016) . Future studies should clarify the emotion-specific neural processing in moral injury. Fifth, the CAPS is a clinician-administered questionnaire, whereas the MIES is a self-report questionnaire. This difference might contribute to disparate neural findings in theory, but we have no plausible explanation to account for distinct neural responses related to the method of gathering data (clinician-vs. self-administered). Future work investigating the neural correlates of symptoms of either moral injury or PTSD will help to delineate the underpinnings of the two clinically overlapping syndromes in overlapping populations.
In conclusion, we found that CAPS and MIES sub-scales, that is, that enrich our understanding of PTSD beyond the existing fear-based models (Pitman et al., 2012) . 
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